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Abstract
Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people 
reflect upon their own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is 
but an instance of a larger class of representational re-description processes that we 
assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From this perspective, the brain 
continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the consequences of action or 
activity on itself, on the world, and on other people through three predictive loops: An 
inner loop, a perception–action loop, and a self–other (social cognition) loop, which 
together form a tangled hierarchy. We ask what kinds of mechanisms may subtend this 
form of enactive metacognition. We extend previous neural network simulations and 
compare the model with Signal Detection Theory, highlighting that while the latter 
approach assumes that both type I  (objective) and type II (subjective, metacognition-
based) decisions tap into the same signal at different hierarchical levels, our approach is 
closer to dual-route models in that it assumes that the re-descriptions made possible by 
the emergence of meta-representations occur independently and outside of the first-
order causal chain. We close by reviewing relevant neurological evidence for the idea 
that awareness, self-awareness and social cognition involve the same mechanisms.
Keywords: Consciousness, metacognition, blindsight, artificial grammar learning, neural 
networks, social cognition
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1. Introduction
There is undoubtedly a relationship between awareness and metacognition, for our common 
understanding of conscious knowledge is simply that it is knowledge that we know we possess. 
Congruently, it is precisely in those cases where our behaviour is guided by knowledge we do not 
know we possess that we speak of unconscious knowledge. Colloquially, thus, metacognition, or 
“cognition about cognition”, appears to be fundamental to our understanding of consciousness. 
However, metacognition is usually construed as a controlled, intentional process whereby people 
intentionally and effortfully reflect upon their own mental activity. Here, we would instead like to 
suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of representational re-description 
processes [1] that we assume occur unconsciously, automatically, and continuously. From this 
perspective, the brain is continuously and unconsciously learning to anticipate the consequences of 
action or activity on itself, on the world, and on other people. In so doing, we shall argue, it learns 
to re-present its own activity to itself, so developing systems of meta-representations that 
characterise the manner in which first-order representations are held. Such systems of meta-
representations both enable conscious experience (for it is in virtue of such meta-representations 
that the agent “knows that it knows”) and define its subjective character (for each agent’s meta-
representations will be idiosyncratic, shaped by its experience with the world and with others).
To support these ideas, we begin by discussing the relationships between consciousness and 
metacognition. Next, we ask what kinds of mechanisms are necessary to subtend it. We argue that 
Signal Detection Theory (SDT), as applied to the study of consciousness, has a descriptive 
character that we should like to see replaced by a mechanistic account. We propose such an account 
in the next section, based on the neural network models we initially introduced in two previous 
papers [2,3]. Next, we analyse the performance of such models through Signal Detection Analysis, 
explore their implications for our understanding of consciousness, and overview relevant 
neurological evidence. We close by suggesting that consciousness is something that the brain learns 
to do rather than a static property of certain neural representations and not others. This we call the 
“Radical Plasticity Thesis”.
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2. Metacognition
Metacognition covers a lot of ground. It has been variously construed as the ability to reflect upon 
one’s own mental activity (“cognition about cognition”), as awareness of possessing task-relevant 
knowledge (so-called judgment knowledge [4]), or as the introspective mechanism that lies at the 
core of perceptual awareness (i.e., sensory metacognition). A number of recent papers have 
addressed both the neurobiological underpinnings of metacognition [5–7], as well as its functions 
and mechanisms [8,9]. 
The complex relationship between consciousness, self-awareness, and metacognition is the object 
of an ongoing debate (e.g., [10,11] – see also [8] for an overview). In a nutshell, the argument hinges 
on whether metacognition is taken to be a precondition or a consequence of consciousness. 
Contemporary theories of consciousness, in this respect, roughly fall into one of two categories: 
those that see capacity for metacognition as a consequence of content becoming conscious and 
therefore available to higher-order processes and introspection (so-called “fame-in-the-brain” 
approaches), and those that assume that some form of metacognition is a necessary prerequisite for 
consciousness. 
“Fame in the brain”  theories, introduced by Dennett [12,13], typically assume that consciousness 
occurs whenever particular conditions are fulfilled, such as stability and strength or complexity of a 
knowledge representation, which can result from processes such as re-entrant processing and/or 
from synchrony of neural processing. Essentially, it is assumed that the brain is a large dynamical 
system in which stable, attractor states come in and out of existence as a result of continuously 
operating global constraint satisfaction processes. The main functional consequence of such states is 
that the information they convey then becomes available to the global workspace [14–16] for 
further information processing, such as cognitive control, or conscious access. However, one 
problem with “fame-in-the-brain”  proposals is that there is no particular property of the information 
contained in conscious representations, apart from strength, stability or complexity, that sets it 
qualitatively apart from information contained in unconscious representations. All information 
remains first-order information in the system, and some of that information somehow gives rise to 
conscious awareness of it.
As an alternative point of view, approaches that take higher-order- or meta-representations as a 
prerequisite for consciousness hold that in order for content to become conscious, a system needs to 
be able to represent its internal states to itself. In other words, for a system to be conscious of its 
internal states, said internal states have to become available to inspection, in addition to serving 
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their first-order functions. As Karmiloff-Smith [1] put it: knowledge in the system has to become 
knowledge for the system. First-order systems —   systems that merely transform, however 
appropriately, inputs into outputs — can never know that they know: They simply lack the 
appropriate machinery [17]. This points to a fundamental difference between sensitivity and 
awareness. Sensitivity merely entails the ability to respond in specific ways to certain states of 
affairs. Sensitivity does not require consciousness in any sense. A thermostat can appropriately be 
characterised as being sensitive to temperature, just as the carnivorous plant Dionaea muscipula 
(Venus flytrap) may appropriately be described as being sensitive to movement on the surface of its 
leaves. But our intuitions tell us that such sensitive systems (thermostats, photodiodes, transistors, 
cameras, carnivorous plants) are not conscious. They do not have “elementary experiences”, they 
simply have no experiences whatsoever. Sensitivity can involve highly sophisticated knowledge, 
and even learned knowledge, but such knowledge is always first-order knowledge, it is always 
knowledge that is necessarily embedded in the very same causal chain through which processing 
occurs. 
Awareness, on the other hand, always seems to minimally entail the ability of knowing that one 
knows. This ability, after all, forms the basis for the verbal reports we take to be the most direct 
indication of awareness. And when we observe the absence of such ability to report on the 
knowledge involved in our decisions, we conclude that the decision was based on unconscious 
knowledge. Thus, it is when an agent exhibits knowledge of the fact that he is sensitive to some 
state of affairs that we take this agent to be a conscious agent. This second-order knowledge, we 
argue, critically depends on learned systems of metarepresentations, and forms the basis for 
conscious experience of the first-order knowledge that is the target of such metarepresentations. 
Despite remaining heavily debated, this higher-order approach to consciousness has received 
substantial support recently [10,18–22] (see also [8] for a recent overview) and is currently enjoying 
renewed interest.
Irrespective of whether one sees metacognition as a consequence or as a prerequisite to awareness 
there remains the questions of what mechanisms subtend it. In this respect, Lau [23] has defended 
the idea that metacognition involves the brain performing signal detection on its own 
representations. For instance, in a typical visual detection or discrimination task aimed at 
investigating task performance and awareness, participants have an “objective”  discrimination 
performance, and a “subjective”  awareness rating. SDT approaches to awareness [9,24–28] model 
this relationship by assuming that for each of these judgments, the participant’s (and the brain’s) 
task comes down to representing the outside world in terms of stimulus and noise, and looking for 
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decision criteria to set both apart in objective (type I) and subjective (type II) terms. In general 
terms, this comes down to calculating two sensitivities and criteria. Type I sensitivity d’1 is, as 
usual, based on the proportion of hits with respect to the proportion of false alarms in the context of 
the actual task, and criterion c1 represents the bias with which the participant tends to be 
conservative versus risk-taking (in detection tasks; or selects one response option over the other in 
discrimination tasks). Type II sensitivity d’2, however, which is the degree to which one can tell 
apart one’s correct from one’s false responses, is thus the number of “awareness hits”  with respect 
to “awareness false alarms.”  This, if awareness is measured by rating one’s confidence in one’s 
response, d’2  reflects the proportion of high confidence ratings for my correct responses with 
respect to the proportion of high confidence ratings for wrong responses, whereas c2 reflects my 
bias in terms of how prone I am to rate my confidence as high or low. The relationship between type 
I and type II SDT analysis has been described in depth elsewhere [29].
Within this general framework however, important differences exist between how “fame-in-the-
brain”  or higher-order approaches characterise this relationship. Recent modelling work [27] has 
laid out the different classes of possible models that follow from the above distinction within a 
SDT framework. The study distinguishes three types of models: first-order models, which assume 
that one stream of information accounts for both behavioural output and awareness of this output, 
dual-channel models, which assume that information that informs behaviour is essentially 
processed along a different channel than that which informs awareness of this information, and 
hierarchical models, which assume that information is first processed on a first-order level (which 
determines behaviour), and that a second-order level is necessary to make the information available 
to awareness. The modelling results [27] show that hierarchical SDT models outperform first-order 
or dual-channel models. 
SDT, however, offers essentially a descriptive account of the relationships between type I and type 
II performance. Here, building on earlier work, we would like to propose a computational account 
[2,3] of these relationships. This proposal is motivated by different reasons. 
First, as mentioned before, both “fame in the brain”  and higher-order approaches as operationalised 
in SDT somehow assume that metacognition, whether a consequence or a prerequisite, is 
necessarily tied to consciousness. Here we argue that metacognition may be an instance of a larger 
class of learning-related representational re-description processes [1] that, we assume, occur 
unconsciously and automatically.
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Second, we believe that, whereas SDT might provide a conceptual description of what occurs in any 
given visual detection or discrimination task (as mentioned above: the brain performing signal 
detection on itself), it offers no explanation as to how such signal detection might come about and 
therefore remains largely descriptive: it is not because people behave as if performing a signal 
detection task that this is how the brain produces this behaviour. This is not an argument about 
biological plausibility (which has also been criticised for neural network models), but about 
explanatory power. In our opinion SDT models lack an account of how the brain develops criteria, 
how it develops a representation of the world, and how it develops awareness. In our view, it is 
crucial to incorporate an organism’s interaction with the world in order to understand how 
metacognition develops.
Third, conceptually, type II SDT in the context of awareness is somewhat ambiguous. In a type I 
task, there is, objectively, a stimulus present or not, and we can say there is one, or not – there is no 
a priori relationship (d’1) between the two. Thus, my ratings can correspond to or diverge from the 
actual probability of a stimulus being present in the experiment. A type II task (e.g., confidence 
ratings) are completely different. There is a probability of correct decisions (which is a match 
between the world an the type I decision), but I do not simply provide subjective ratings that 
correspond or diverge from this probability. This is because a guess is just that, a guess. Confidence 
in a response A (instead of B) indeed means that I thought it was A, but when I claim to guess, I do 
not say “A is wrong,”  and that it should be B – rather, it means that for all I care it could be either of 
them. Overall, there are usually no (or very few) trials in which I know I was wrong, I am just not 
sure whether I was right. Indeed, if I consistently say “guess”  only for trials where I make an error, I 
am in fact fully aware (see zero correlation criterion [30]). So in principle, irrespective of the 
relative proportion of guesses on correct versus incorrect trials (the “misses”  versus the “correct 
rejections”), those “guess”  trials should contribute in equal proportions, or not at all, to how I 
represent my decisions to myself, since when I guess, I do not state that my type I decision was 
wrong. Thus, at least in our opinion, type II tasks cannot be seen simply as a higher-level equivalent 
of type I tasks. There are many ways in which one can define the relationship between type I and 
type II decision axes, but those described by Maniscaldo and Lau [27] do not include a mechanism 
that accounts for the accrual over time on both decision axes and how their relationship comes to be 
established.
Fourth, on a more general note, in our view SDT, irrespective of whether it is implemented as a 
first-order, dual-channel, or hierarchical model, assumes (1) that a noisy but rich signal enters the 
sensory channels, and (2) that the brain represents one or two sensitivities (d’) and sets at least two 
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criteria (c) that allow for the selection of the adequate type I and type II outputs. Apart from the fact 
that these criteria have to be arbitrarily chosen and hence that there is no explanation on how they 
come about, this approach is reminiscent of traditional filter models and of spectatorial accounts of 
cognition in general, whereby the senses receive massive (though noisy) amounts of information, 
and where the passive observer’s brain is merely tasked to extract the signal. In this respect, one of 
the important variables manipulated in Maniscaldo and Lau’s [27] hierarchical models is a decay 
factor, which determines how much of the first-order information remains for the second-order 
classification. This suggests, first, that somehow at one point there is an enormous amount of 
information (rich phenomenal consciousness) that dissipates over time, leaving only limited access 
to whatever remains [31,32], and second, that consciousness is essentially a passive endeavour. 
Indeed, using a decay, one has to subscribe to the fact that consciousness “slips through our fingers” 
– whereas in fact there have been recent findings suggesting that consciousness takes time [33], and 
that over this time, many misconstruals can happen [34,35]. In fact, it has been argued that 
conscious content is but an “illusion”  created by the brain based on piecemeal sensory input in 
combination with priors (partial awareness hypothesis [36]; see also [37]), a notion which, to some 
extent, is also in line with an enactive view on consciousness [38,39], whereby the agent, embedded 
in an environment, is not a spectator but plays an active role in constructing his awareness of that 
environment and of himself (see below for an elaboration of this idea). Thus, even if one accepts 
that SDT criteria can be influenced by priors, there is no account of how this might happen. Taken 
together with the second point, SDT accounts are very useful at a descriptive level, but lack a 
developmental perspective, both in terms of how they come about through interaction of an 
organism with the world, and in terms of how conscious content is generated based on priors 
acquired through such interactions. The simulation work we carried out in Pasquali et al. [2] is an 
attempt to offer an alternative, computationally oriented, account. We revisit this work in the next 
section. 
3. A hybrid neural network approach
We recently proposed a neural network approach to metacognition [2,3]. The core idea of our 
approach, which bears some resemblance to the actor-critic models introduced by Sutton and Barto 
[40], is that two independent networks (a “first-order”  network and a “second-order” network) are 
connected to each other in such a way that the entire first-order network is input to the second-order 
network (figure 1). This means that all the units of the first-order network are used as input for a 
Higher-order thoughts in action 8/31
second network, which can then in principle  learn to discriminate the different ways in which the 
first-order network’s internal representations match the outside world.
Figure 1. General architecture of a metacognitive network. A first-order network, consisting for instance 
of a simple three-layers backpropagation network, is trained to perform a simple classification task and 
thus contains knowledge that links inputs to outputs in such a way that the network can produce type I 
responses. This entire first-order network then constitutes the input to a second-order network, the task of 
which consists of redescribing the activity of the first-order network in some way. Here, the task that this 
second-order network is trained to perform is to issue type II responses, that is, judgments about the 
extent to which the first-order network has performed its task correctly. One can think of the first-order 
network as instantiating cases where the brain learns about the world, and of the second-order network as 
instantiating cases where the brain learns about itself.
Both networks are, for instance, simple feedforward back-propagation networks. The first-order 
network is trained to perform a simple discrimination task, that is, to produce type I responses, 
whereas the second is trained to judge of the accuracy of the first-order network’s responses, that is, 
to perform type II judgments. In its more general form, as depicted in figure 1, such an architecture 
would also be sufficient for the second-order network to also perform other kinds of judgments, 
such as distinguishing between an hallucination and a veridical perception, developing knowledge 
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about the overall geography of the internal representations held by the first-order network, or 
forming propositional attitudes. 
The fundamental difference between this type of model (a “metacognitive network”) and SDT 
models is that the former learns and develops both first- and second-order representations over time. 
Pasquali et al. [2] instantiated the general architecture depicted in figure 1 in different ways. One 
instantiation was a strictly hierarchical model (figure 2a) whereas the other is best described as 
implementing a hybrid between dual-route models and hierarchical models (figure 2b). 
Figure 2. (a) Network architecture for the Iowa Gambling Task simulation (see [2], simulation 3). The 
network consists of a first-order feedforward backpropagator, of which the hidden units feedforward into 
a set of second-order hidden units, which in turn feed forward into two wagering units. (b) Network 
architecture for the Blindsight and AGL simulations (see Pasquali et al 2010, simulations 1 and 2). The 
network consists of a first-order feedforward backpropagation autoassociator, of which the input and 
output units are connected through fixed weights to a second-order comparator, which in turn feeds 
forward into two wagering units.
The hierarchical instantiation, which we will here dub “hidden unit-readers”  (figure 2a)  (see [3], 
and [2], simulation 3), directly reads out the first-order network’s internal representations from its 
hidden units (containing the relationships between input and output patterns [41]. The model is 
hierarchical because the sensory input needs to be fully processed by the first-order network before 
it becomes available to the second-order network. The information contained in the second-order 
network is directly dependent on the information contained in the first-order network in that the 
hidden unit patterns predict both the first-order and the second-order responses. 
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Re-representing knowledge through meta-representations (i.e., “content-explicit representations”) is 
not sufficient, however: one must also represent oneself as being in possession of that content 
(“attitude-explicit representations”  [42]). Such attitude-explicit representations require access to the 
relevant first-order knowledge in a manner that is independent from the causal chain in which it is 
embedded, such that not only the content but also the accuracy of the knowledge is represented. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that metacognition hinges upon encoding the precision of a 
representation, because this would allow organisms not only to evaluate what they know, but to 
engage in prospective error monitoring and optimisation of decision making, for instance by 
smoothing the accrual of evidence for the “right” decision over time [43].
We also explored the characteristics of a second instantiation (figure 2b; ‘comparator units’, [2]: 
simulations 1 and 2), which indirectly reads out the first-order network’s internal representations by 
comparing first-order input with first-order output (the latter of which is, in fact, the computational 
consequence of the hidden unit patterns). In these networks, the second-order network lies outside 
of the first-order causal chain, because the information used by the first-order network to execute its 
task is not the information used by the second-order network to place a high or a low wager. Thus, 
they are in principle dual-channel models. Still, since both networks “plug into”  the same basic 
knowledge (first-order performance; albeit in a different way, see below), this type of model is 
effectively a hybrid between hierarchical and dual-route models. 
Our hybrid models thus depend on two core assumptions: First, evaluating one’s own performance 
requires that the first-order representations that are responsible for performance be accessed in a 
manner that is independent from their expression in behaviour.  Second, one must possess attitude-
explicit representations that require access to the relevant first-order knowledge in a manner that is 
independent from the causal chain in which it is embedded, such that not only the content but also 
the accuracy of the knowledge is represented. The first of these assumptions refers to the 
hierarchical component of the models, whereas the second refers to their dual-channel aspect. 
Obviously, the notion of independence of the first-order causal chain is also present in dual-channel 
SDT models. One of the consequences of using non-dual channel SDT to model type I and type II 
decisions is that, when there is no type I sensitivity, then there is no type II sensitivity: when there is 
no signal to discriminate between the presence or absence of a stimulus, or between two stimuli, 
there should in principle be no signal to base one’s subjective rating on – something which, in the 
context of sensory metacognition, is at least plausible. However, Scott et al. [44] recently 
demonstrated why a model of metacognition should exhibit such independence. Specifically, they 
showed, in an artificial grammar learning (AGL) task, that participants could perform better than 
Higher-order thoughts in action 11/31
chance in expressing judgments about their own performance (type II decisions) in spite of the fact 
that their performance (type I discrimination) was actually at chance! Such findings have two 
implications. First, strictly first-order and hierarchical models cannot account for such dissociations, 
which is suggestive that only dual-channel models have enough generality. Second, such findings 
support the idea that the information contained in the first-order network can be used in different, 
perhaps orthogonal decision criteria. Our hybrid-hierarchical comparator models do precisely that, 
in that they use the prediction error of the first-order network in a different way for first- and 
second-order decisions. In particular, while the first-order network takes its decisions based on the 
performance error (the standard SSE), the second-order network’s decisions are based on a more 
detailed pattern representation of the first-order error. Thus, the second-order network learns to 
redescribe the error committed by the first-order network explicitly, as a pattern of activation rather 
than as a scalar signal. This is what enables it to leverage information that may not be captured by 
the first-order error. In principle, this might reflect the fact that, even if a first-order decision is 
predominantly subject to bias without any discriminative sensitivity, there is still enough 
information in the first-order performance signal in order to detect when one is wrong and when 
right in a discrimination task. In other words, the second-order network has a finer grained access to 
the first-order error, precisely because it can “look at”  the error by representing it as a (potentially 
manipulable) pattern of activation, rather than just use it to guide output, as the first-order network 
does. In light of Scott et al.’s [44] data, this would mean that, even though the overall first-order 
error with respect to string grammaticality cannot be used to distinguish between strings in a type I 
task, the way in which those strings elicit errors is detectable by the second-order system, and hence 
reflected in above-chance type II judgments.
4. An SDT analysis of the hybrid metacognitive model
Our simulations were able to successfully account for the pattern of associations and dissociations 
between performance and confidence (or wagering) observed in the Iowa Gambling task, in an 
Artificial Grammar Learning task, and in blindsight. Here, we sought to analyse the hybrid model’s 
performance in terms of SDT. Thus, we performed SDT analyses on the performance of the network 
in the Artificial Grammar Learning Task and in blindsight. ([2]; electronic supplementary material).
In the Artificial Grammar Learning Task simulation, the first-order network was trained, as in 
Persaud et al. [45], to discriminate grammatical from non-grammatical strings of letters, while the 
second-order network was trained to produce wagers on the first-order network’s decisions. We 
showed [2] how the model was able to capture the patterns of associations and dissociations 
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between classification performance and wagering in the two conditions (implicit and explicit) tested 
by Persaud et al. [45]. 
Here, to analyse the model’s performance using SDT, we replicated our original simulations, 
inserting a test block – instances of new grammatical strings and of non-grammatical strings – after 
every block of the learning phase and not only after the third (implicit condition) and the twelfth 
(explicit condition) block as it was the case in the original study. This small modification of the 
simulation setup allowed us to capture the networks’ performance at every step during the learning 
phase (figure 3a). As expected, type I sensitivity d’1 steadily increases from 0 to a maximum value 
through learning, reflecting a progressively larger proportion of hits – correct discriminations of the 
new grammatical strings – than of false alarms – incorrect discriminations of the ungrammatical 
strings. In addition, networks tend to lose their initial conservative bias (type I c) as their knowledge 
develops. At the end of the learning phase, the neural networks end up with perfect knowledge of 
the grammar, as suggested by a high type I sensitivity and a null type I criterion. Type II sensitivity 
and criterion follow roughly the same pattern, although d’2 does not increase as much as d’1 and 
although c2 here appears to already start from a neutral value (but higher initial criterion values 
were sometimes obtained in other simulations). As a reminder, the second-order network had 
already been trained in a pre-training phase and no more updates of its internal weights occurred 
afterwards, that is, during the actual learning phase. Thus, the second-order network behaves as a 
simple observer of the first-order network’s knowledge and yet, its type II performance improves 
just as well through the learning phase, as reflected by a greater sensitivity and a neutral bias at the 
end of the task. Finally, by comparing type I and type II measures on the figures, one may notice 
that objective performance seems to have shaped subjective performance in this simulation, just as 
one would have predicted from a purely hierarchical architecture.
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Figure 3. SDT analyses of the model’s performance. A (type I and type II scores) chart reflects both 
objective and subjective measures in the AGL simulation ; B (type I and type II scores) chart reflects both 
objective and subjective measures in the blindsight simulation. (Data points for blindsight test type I d’ 
and type II c overlap)
Our second implementation of the hybrid model was dedicated to capturing blindsight. In their 
Blindsight experiment, Persaud et al. [45] showed that blindsight subject GY (i.e., a patient who, 
under specific circumstances, makes visual discriminations in the absence of visual awareness), 
when presented with sub-threshold stimuli in his blind field, displayed above chance localisation 
performance but failed to maximise his earnings through wagering, suggesting that he was not 
always aware of the knowledge involved in his decisions for stimulus localisation. However, for 
supra-threshold stimuli (both in normal and blind fields), GY maximised performance as well as 
earnings. We successfully simulated these results [2] by pre-training the networks to discriminate 
amongst arbitrary positions of a stimulus and to simultaneously place wagers on their own 
performance. The distinction between supra-threshold and sub-threshold blindsight vision was 
introduced during a subsequent testing phase, in which the networks classified the patterns they had 
previously been presented with (supra-threshold), as well as degraded versions of these patterns in 
which stimulus-to-noise ratio was manipulated by increasing the noise level (sub-threshold). Here, 
we look at how the model’s performance develops over time, and at how the model accounts for 
blindsight in light of Persaud’s data.
To track the model’s performance over time, we used the same procedure as for the AGL 
simulation, inserting test blocks after each block of the pre-training phase. We thus captured the 
networks’ objective and subjective performance through the pre-training phase – results at the 150th 
block reflecting one’s normal performance in a standard subliminal detection task –, as well as in a 
post-test blindsight condition for which the level of background noise in input was raised (see 
figure 3b). Only after a short time of adaptation—the required time for the networks to learn to see 
anything, which may end around block 30 in the pre-training phase—type I performance seems to 
evolve perfectly normally. With training, d’1 starts to increase, as the networks progressively 
become able to discriminate between noise and signals. However c1 never reaches the null value, 
indicating the maintenance of a conservative policy. This, of course, is due to the fact that a few of 
the stimuli are displayed below the noise threshold and hence cannot be discriminated properly by 
the networks. Keeping a conservative bias thus prevents the networks from exhibiting too high a 
rate of false alarms. By contrast, type II scores seem rather peculiar. By the time the networks 
“learn to see”, type II d’ has reached its maximum value, and type II c is at its lowest, that is, 
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second-order networks have acquired a very high sensitivity but also a very liberal bias. One might 
think that they are somehow fully “open-minded”, which pays off since subjective performance 
overrides the lack of objective knowledge in this case. Following this phase, type II sensitivity 
returns to a more moderate value while the criterion’s slope tends towards a conservative value, as 
if bounded again by type I knowledge. Finally, type II scores in the post-test blindsight situation 
confirm our earlier findings [2], that is, a preserved sensitivity but a highly conservative bias. 
Whereas our overall results match the general findings by Persaud et al. [45], this criterion-setting 
account of blindsight diverges from Persaud et al.’s data, which suggest a decreased sensitivity, and 
not a criterion setting problem was underlying the failure to optimise wagering. However, 
Overgaard et al. [46,47], showed that this decreased-sensitivity account is linked to use of 
dichotomous measures such as the high vs. low wagers used by Persaud et al., whereas use of more 
graded measures reveals that in fact sensitivity is preserved but that patients use a very conservative 
criterion, which is what our current analysis suggests as well, and what others propose in this issue 
[11].
Our analyses thus highlight the hybrid character of the model. Indeed, in the AGL simulation, type 
II performance directly depends upon type I performance, whereas in the blindsight simulation, the 
second order network is able to build relevant meta-knowledge despite the first-order network’s 
poor performance. 
In closing, we should stress that the models we have presented have substantial limitations. Two 
such limitations are worth highlighting. The first is that the models fail to be dynamical. Responses 
are computed in a single time step, whereas we envision the relevant type I and type II processes as 
unfolding over time. The second is that the models fail to be recurrent: The meta-representations 
developed in the second-order network cannot influence the representations developed in the first-
order network. Going beyond these two limitations is important for the following reason: When 
responses take time to be computed by a first-order network that contains multiple levels (e.g., 6 or 
7 layers of hidden units), the second-order network may actually, were it able to influence the states 
of the first-order network, compute or at least bias the appropriate type I response even before the 
first-order network has completed its own processing. In other words, the second-order network 
would then be able to predict future states of the output layer of the first-order network. This would 
capture a central idea in our framework, namely that the brain continuously learns to predict the 
consequences of activity in one region on activity on other regions (what we call the “inner loop”, 
see below). Augmenting our models with the necessary computational mechanisms will require 
using different, fully recurrent, dynamical learning algorithms.
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5. Learning to be conscious: Metacognition as Radical Plasticity
What are the implications of this approach to metacognition as a dynamic representational re-
description process? First, this approach suggests that metacognition (and hence, consciousness) 
takes time, at different time scales, that is, over a single trial, over learning, and over development. 
Second, this approach suggests that metacognition, far from being mere filtering as perhaps 
suggested by SDT, is an active, trained construction process. Recent work supports the idea that one 
can train people to gain conscious access to their own representations. For instance, participants can 
be trained to improve their performance in subliminal perception tasks [48], aversive learning can 
teach people to make novel olfactory distinctions [49], and imposing a deadline on simultaneous 
type I and type II ratings interfered with the degree to which participants were able to identify their 
correct responses [33] (interestingly, type I performance was also affected, but only on those trials 
for which people had claimed to be sure, suggesting that disruption of this metacognitive signal 
affects lower-level processing). It has been suggested [43] that gradual learning of (type II) 
precision estimates over a certain amount of time is particularly useful “in situations where the 
causes of perceptual evidence may change unpredictably over time, and as such may provide a 
better account of the sort of fluid, ongoing sensorimotor integration that characterises everyday 
activities such as riding a bicycle.”  Indeed, the creation of a conscious experience of the world may 
protect us and our brain from piecemeal and unpredictable sensory input.
Second, we would instead like to suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of 
representational re-description processes that, as stated before, occur unconsciously and 
automatically. From this perspective, the brain is continuously and unconsciously learning to 
anticipate the consequences of action or activity on itself, on the world, and on other people (see 
below for elaborations on the latter two). There is considerable evidence for such hierarchical 
predictive mechanisms in the human brain [50], through which the brain continuously attempts to 
minimise “surprise” or conflict by anticipating its own future activity based on learned priors. 
Through these predictive mechanisms, the brain develops systems of meta-representations that 
characterise and qualify the target first-order representations. Such learned re-descriptions, enriched 
by the emotional value associated with them, form the basis of conscious experience. Learning and 
plasticity are, thus, central to metacognition and consciousness, to the extent that experiences only 
occur in experiencers that have learned to know that they possess certain first-order states and that 
have learned to care more about certain states than about others. Cleeremans [19,51] has termed this 
view the “Radical Plasticity Thesis.”  While this paper is concerned primarily with meta-
representation as a prerequisite for consciousness, this “caring about”  aspect is equally crucial to 
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our model of consciousness, in that the knowledge that resides in those meta-representations (i.e., 
the knowledge about the first-order representations) has to have relevance for the organism. It has to 
matter to an organism whether the first-order state is A or B. Such relevance may be related to 
prospective error monitoring [43], or may be related to motivational and emotional components.
The idea that predictive re-description processes take place unconsciously can in fact be argued to 
form the core of the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of consciousness [21], according to 
which a representation is a conscious representation when one is conscious of it. In other words, by 
HOT, it is in virtue of the occurrence of (unconscious) higher-order thoughts “that we are now 
conscious of some content,”  that the content becomes phenomenally conscious. This, we surmise, 
requires the ability for the agent to re-describe its own states to itself as suggested above. We further 
suggest that a system’s ability to re-describe its own knowledge to itself minimally requires (1) the 
existence of recurrent structures that enable the system to access its own states, and (2) the 
existence of predictive models (meta-representations) that make it possible for the system to 
characterise and anticipate the occurrence of first-order states. Importantly however, here, and in 
contrast to HOT, such meta-representational models (1) may be local and hence occur anywhere in 
the brain, (2) can be sub-personal, (3) are subject, just like first-order representations, to learning 
and plasticity mechanisms and, hence, can themselves become automatic.
Note that the proposed metacognitive architecture instantiates the minimal requirements necessary 
to enable a cognitive system to distinguish between veridical perceptions and hallucinations 
(something a pure first-order system would be unable to do) and, more generally, to develop the 
metacognitive knowledge necessary to represent the manner in which its own first-order knowledge 
is held, that is, propositional attitudes (is this a belief? a hope? a regret?).
6. Beyond consciousness: Three predictive loops
As discussed above, the core idea of our proposal is that the brain is continuously and 
unconsciously learning to anticipate the consequences of action or activity on itself, on the world, 
and on other people. Thus we have three closely interwoven loops that link the brain with itself, 
with the world, and with other agents, all driven by the same prediction-based mechanisms (figure 
4). A first, internal or “inner loop”, involves the brain re-describing its own representations to itself 
as a result of its continuous and unconscious attempts of predicting how activity in one region 
influences activity in other regions. In other words: The brain does not know in and of itself that 
there is a causal link between, say, activity in supplementary motor area and activity in primary 
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motor cortex, or between any other cerebral regions that are so causally linked. The knowledge 
contained in such feedforward links is thus implicit to the extent that there is no mechanism to 
access it directly. Our proposal, largely based on Friston’s own analysis [52], is that the brain learns 
to render this implicit knowledge explicit by re-describing it through unconscious prediction-driven 
mechanisms. This is essentially the mechanism that our simulations attempt to capture. 
The second loop is the familiar “perception-action loop”. It results from the agent as a whole 
continuously predicting the consequences of its actions on the world. 
The third loop is the “self-other loop”, and links the agent with other agents, again using the exact 
same set of prediction-based mechanisms as involved in the other two loops. The existence of this 
third loop is constitutive of conscious experience, we argue, for it is in virtue of the fact that as an 
agent I am constantly attempting to model other minds that I am able to develop an understanding 
of myself. The processing carried out by the inner loop is thus causally dependent on the existence 
of both the perception-action loop and the self-other loop, with the entire system forming a “tangled 
hierarchy” (e.g., Hofstadter’s concept of “a strange loop” [53]) of predictive internal models. 
Figure 4. Three tangled loops (see text for details)
This third predictive loop thus extends beyond the agent into the social world. Consistently with the 
recent proposal by Carruthers [10], we surmise that understanding ourselves depends on ability to 
anticipate the consequences of our actions on other agents. Roughly, successfully anticipating how 
other agents will react to the actions we direct towards them requires that we have built internal 
models of how such agents will react to our actions. We assumed that such model building is 
enabled by automatic prediction of the other’s actions in ongoing dynamic interaction [37, 54]. 
Recently Schilbach et al. [55,56] have suggested that, ontogenetically, becoming an expert in social 
cognition may crucially depend on social interaction while later competencies of more detached, 
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reflective social cognition (mirroring, mentalising) could be a result of reactivating the neural 
networks forged during social interactions (neural “re-use”  [57]) and representationally re-
describing these interaction-based capacities [1,19]. Crucial to this third loop, rather than seeing 
such a re-description as an internally generated, qualitatively different representation of discrete 
knowledge about the world, the “social”  re-description is an ongoing learning process driven by 
increasingly complex interactive contexts, for instance when moving from dyadic to triadic 
interaction, which creates the possibility and need to communicate with respect to an external, third 
object or person [58]. In this light, e.g. language might not only be shaped by social interaction, but 
also the other way around, with the gradual development of language providing a scaffolding that 
allows implicit social know-how to develop in explicit social knowledge. Social context as a driving 
force for learning has, indeed, been recognised in language learning [59], child development [60], 
and social cognition [61]. Recently, it has also been suggested that mirror neurons might be the 
result of reinforcement learning [62–64]. Thus, the third loop conceptualises metacognition as 
resulting from predictive learning mechanisms that allow for agents to simultaneously learn about 
the environment as well as about their own internal representations. The ongoing re-descriptions 
that this entails, make for a potential explanation of how implicit precursors to mentalising (such as 
gaze following) later develop into explicit Theory of Mind and our capacity to consciously reason 
about others and ourselves [65].
Finally, the idea that all three loops may be subtended by the same mechanisms is supported by 
recent findings that metacognition, social interactions, and the processing of self-relevance all 
involve the recruitment of a common set of brain areas. Using an activation-likelihood estimation 
(ALE) approach, Schilbach et al. [66] recently investigated the statistical convergence of results 
from functional neuroimaging studies that had respectively targeted social cognition, emotional 
processing and unconstrained cognition, based on the assumption that a “common denominator” 
could exist in cognitive terms, consisting in a reliance on introspective processes, in particular 
prospective meta-cognition. By exploring the commonalities of the results from these three 
individual meta-analyses by means of a conjunction analysis, the authors were, indeed, able to 
provide empirical evidence for a shared neural network localised in dorso-medial prefrontal cortex 
and in the precuneus. These two regions are known to be critical hubs in the neurofunctional 
architecture of the human brain [67–73] and have been shown to be closely related to introspective 
ability [6]. Crucially, comparing the results of our conjunction analysis to the recent findings by 
Fleming at al. [6] demonstrates anatomical overlap both in PFC and the precuneus (figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Comparison of studies of Fleming et al.  [6] and Schilbach et al. [66]. Neuroanatomical overlap 
between areas related to individual differences in metacoginive abilities as reported in [6], and significant 
results of a triple conjunction analysis of ALE meta-analyses targeting functional neuroimaging studies of 
social cognition, emotional processing and unconstrained cognition [66]. Statistical convergence of 
functional neuroimaging results in dorso-medial prefrontal cortex and the precuneus are displayed on the 
surface view of the MNI single subject template. Taken from Schilbach et al. [66].
Interestingly, the two brain regions that appear to be involved both in social cognition and 
introspective or meta-cognitive processes are part of what has become known as the “default mode 
of brain function”  [67]. We have recently argued that this convergence might be taken to suggest 
that the physiological baseline of the human brain, i.e. the default mode network, is related to a 
psychological baseline of social cognition [55]. Here, we extend this argument by suggesting that 
social interactions might enable introspective processes and conscious experience while relying on 
changes in the activity of the default mode network. Congruently, Carhart-Harris and Friston [74]
have recently argued that the default mode network might realise the Freudian secondary process, 
i.e. the “mode of cognition of the ego”, or in other words, normal waking consciousness. Strikingly, 
this analysis is rooted in a Bayesian perspective on the brain, which assumes that the brain uses 
internal hierarchical models to predict its sensory inputs and suggests that neural activity tries to 
minimise the ensuing prediction-error or (Helmholtzian) free energy [52,74]. Consistent with the 
proposal of key regions of the default mode network subserving introspective processes and social 
cognition and our claim that these abilities take time to develop, it has been found that connectivity 
within the Default Mode Network (DMN) develops through ontogeny [75,76]. Importantly, such 
developments hinge upon interactions with the environment and might be necessary to establish a 
balance between internally oriented cognition and engagement with the external world. Apart from 
the empirical evidence for an anatomical overlap of the brain regions relevant for introspection and 
social interaction, Carhart-Harris & Friston’s account [74] can also be taken to suggest that all of 
the three loops, which we assume are relevant for metacognition, rely on similar neural 
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mechanisms, namely internal models that are used to predict network changes based either on 
sensory input or on endogenously generated activation.
7. Conclusion
Overall, our perspective is thus akin to the sensorimotor or enactive perspective [77] and to the 
general conceptual framework provided by forward modelling (e.g., [54]) in the sense that 
awareness is linked with knowledge of the consequences of our actions. Crucially, however, we 
extend the argument inwards (the inner loop) and further outwards (the self-other loop), and 
specifically towards social cognition (see also [78]). Our representations of ourselves are shaped by 
our history of interactions with other agents. Learning about the consequences of the actions that we 
direct towards other agents uniquely requires more sophisticated models of such other agents than 
when interacting with objects, for agents, unlike objects can react to actions directed towards them 
in many different ways as a function of their own internal state. A further important point here is 
that caretakers act as external selves during development, interpreting what happens to developing 
children for them, and so providing meta-representations where they lack. In this light, theory of 
mind can thus be understood as rooted in the very same mechanisms of predictive re-descriptions as 
involved when interacting with the world or with one self (see also [37]). 
Thus we end with the following idea, which we call the “Radical Plasticity Thesis”: The brain 
continuously and unconsciously learns not only about the external world and about other agents, but 
also about its own representations of both. The result of this unconscious learning is conscious 
experience, in virtue of the fact that each representational state is now accompanied by 
(unconscious learnt) meta-representations that convey the mental attitude with which the first-order 
representations are held. From this perspective, there is nothing intrinsic to neural activity, or to 
information per se, that makes it conscious. Conscious experience involves specific mechanisms 
through which particular (i.e., stable, strong, and distinctive) unconscious neural states become the 
target of further processing, which we surmise involves some form of representational re-
description in the sense described by Karmiloff-Smith [1].
Higher-order thoughts in action 22/31
Acknowledgments
Bert Timmermans is supported by a European Commission Marie Curie Fellowship FP7-PEOPLE-
IEF 237502 “Social Brain”. Leonhard Schilbach is supported by the Koeln Fortune Program of the 
Medical Faculty, University of Cologne and the Volkswagen Foundation. Axel Cleeremans is a 
Research Director with the National Fund for Scientific Research (F.R.S.-FNRS, Belgium). 
Higher-order thoughts in action 23/31
References
1	
 Karmiloff-Smith, A. 1992 Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2	
 Pasquali, A., Timmermans, B. & Cleeremans, A. 2010 Know thyself: Metacognitive networks and 
measures of consciousness. Cognition 117, 182-190. (doi 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.08.010)
3	
 Cleeremans, A., Timmermans, B. & Pasquali, A. 2007 Consciousness and metarepresentation: A 
computational sketch. Neural Networks 20, 1032–1039. (doi 10.1016/j.neunet.2007.09.011)
4	
 Scott, R. B. & Dienes, Z. 2008 The conscious, the unconscious, and familiarity. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. 
34, 1264—1288. (doi 10.1037/a0012943)
5	
 Fleming, S. M. & Dolan, R. J., The neural basis of accurate metacognition, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B., this 
issue.
6	
 Fleming, S. M., Weil, R. S., Nagy, Z., Dolan, R. J. & Rees, G. 2010 Relating introspective accuracy to 
individual differences in brain structure. Science 329, 1541–1543. (doi 10.1126/science.1191883)
7	
 Rounis, E., Maniscalco, B., Rothwell, J., Passingham, R. & Lau, H. 2010 Theta-burst transcranial 
magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex impairs metacognitive visual awareness. Cognitive Neurosci. 
1, 165–175. (doi 10.1080/17588921003632529)
8	
 Lau, H. & Rosenthal, D. 2011 Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends 
Cogn. Sci. 15, 365–373. (doi 10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009)
9	
 Pleskac, T. J. & Busemeyer, J. R. 2010 Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision 
time, and confidence. Psychol. Rev. 117, 864–901. (doi 10.1037/a0019737)
10 	
Carruthers, P. 2009 How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and 
metacognition. Behav. Brain Sci. 32, 121—138. (doi 10.1017/S0140525X09000545)
11	
Ko, Y. & Lau, H., A detection theoretic account of blindsight suggests a link between conscious 
perception and metacognition, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B., this issue.
12 	
Dennett, D. C. 1991 Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co.
13 	
Dennett, D. C. 2001 Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition 79, 221–237. (doi 10.1016/
S0010-0277(00)00130-X)
14 	
Baars, B. J. 1988 A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15 	
Dehaene, S., Kerszberg, M. & Changeux, J.-P. 1998 A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful 
cognitive tasks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 95, 14529–14534. (doi 10.1073/pnas.95.24.14529)
16 	
Dehaene, S. & Naccache, L. 2001 Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence 
and a workspace framework. Cognition 79, 1–37. (doi 10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2)
17 	
Clark, A. & Karmiloff-Smith, A. 1993 The Cognizer's innards: A psychological and philosophical 
perspective on the development of thought. Mind Lang. 8, 487-519.
Higher-order thoughts in action 24/31
18 	
Carruthers, P. 2000 Phenomenal consciousness: A naturalistic theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
19 	
Cleeremans, A. 2011 The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the brain learns to be conscious. Front. 
Psychology 2, 86. (doi 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00086)
20 	
Kriegel, U. 2009 Subjective consciousness: A self-representational theory. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.
21 	
Rosenthal, D. M. 2005 Consciousness and Mind. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press
22 	
Rosenthal, D. M., Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation, and function, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B., this 
issue.
23 	
Lau, H. 2008 A higher-order Bayesian decision theory of consciousness. In Models of brain and mind. 
Physical, computational and psychological approaches (eds R. Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti), pp. 35—
48, Prog. Brain Res., Elsevier. (doi 10.1016/S0079-6123(07)68004-2)
24 	
Clifford, C. W. G., Arabzadeh, E. & Harris, J. A. 2008 A good bet to measure awareness. Trends Cogn. 
Sci. 1. (doi 10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.011)
25 	
Snodgrass, M. T. U., Bernat, E. & Shevrin, H. 2004 Unconscious perception: A model-based approach to 
method and evidence. Percept. Psychophys. 66, 846–867. (doi 10.3758/BF03194978)
26 	
Maniscalco, B. & Lau, H. 2012 A signal detection theoretic approach for estimating metacognitive 
sensitivity from confidence ratings. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 422–430. (doi 10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.021)
27 	
Maniscalco, B. & Lau, H. Under review. The signal processing architecture underlying subjective reports 
of sensory awareness.
28 	
Scott, R. B. & Dienes, Z. 2010 Fluency does not express implicit knowledge of artificial grammars. 
Cognition 114, 372—388. (doi 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.10.010)
29 	
Galvin, S. J., Podd, J. V., Drga, V. & Whitmore, J. 2003 Type II tasks in the theory of signal detectability: 
Discrimination between correct and incorrect decisions. Psychon. B. Rev. 10, 843–876.
30 	
Dienes, Z., Altmann, G. T. M., Kwan, L. & Goode, A. 1995 Unconscious knowledge of artificial 
grammars is applied strategically. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. 21, 1322—1338. (doi 
10.1037/0278-7393.21.5.1322)
31 	
Block, N. 2007 Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behav. 
Brain Sci. 30, 481–99. (doi 10.1017/S0140525X07002786)
32 	
Sperling, G. 1960 The information available in brief visual presentation. Psychol. Monogr. 74, 1–29. (doi 
10.1037/h0093759)
33 	
Mealor, A. & Dienes, Z. 2012 No-loss gambling shows the speed of the unconscious. Conscious. Cogn., 
22, 228–237. (doi 10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.001)
34 	
de Gardelle, V., Sackur, J. & Kouider, S. 2009 Perceptual illusions in brief visual presentations. 
Conscious. Cogn. 18, 569–577. (doi 10.1016/j.concog.2009.03.002)
35 	
Kouider, S. & Dupoux, E. 2004 Partial awareness creates the “‘illusion’”  of subliminal semantic priming. 
Psychol. Sci. 15, 75–81. (doi 10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.01502001.x)
Higher-order thoughts in action 25/31
36 	
Kouider, S., de Gardelle, V., Sackur, J. & Dupoux, E. 2010 How rich is consciousness? The partial 
awareness hypothesis. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 301–307. (doi 10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.006)
37 	
Frith, C. D. 2007 Making up the mind: How the brain creates our mental world. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
38 	
Noë, A. 2004 Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
39 	
Noë, A. 2009 Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain and other lessons from the biology of 
consciousness. London, UK: MacMillan.
40 	
Sutton, R.S. & Barto, A.G. 1998 Reinforcement learning: An introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
41 	
Hinton, G. E. 1986 Learning distributed representations of concepts. In Proc. 8th Annu. Conf. Cogn. Sci. 
Soc., Amherst, MA, August 1986, pp. 1–12. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
42 	
Dienes, Z. & Perner, J. 1996 Implicit knowledge in people and connectionist networks. In Implicit 
cognition (ed G. Underwood), pp. 227-256. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
43 	
Yeung, N. & Summerfield, C., Metacognition in human decision making: Confidence and error 
monitoring, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B., this issue.
44 	
Scott, R. B., Dienes, Z. & Seth, A. K. 2011 Higher-order awareness without first-order accuracy: 
implications for models of consciousness. Paper presented at the 15th Annual Meeting of the Assoc. for 
the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Kyoto, Japan, June 2011. (See http://www.theassc.org/files/assc/
Program_201106010_update.pdf for the abstract.)
45 	
Persaud, N., McLeod, P. & Cowey, A. 2007 Post-decision wagering objectively measures awareness. Nat. 
Neurosci. 10, 257–261. (doi 10.1038/nn1840)
46 	
Overgaard, M., Fehl, K., Mouridsen, K., Bergholt, B. & Cleeremans, A. 2008 Seeing without seeing? 
Degraded conscious vision in a blindsight patient. PLoS ONE  3, e3028. (doi 10.1371/journal.pone.
0003028)
47 	
Overgaard, M. & Sandberg, K., Kinds of access: Different methods for report reveal different kinds of 
metacognitive access, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B., this issue.
48 	
Schwiedrzik, C. M., Singer, W. & Melloni, L. 2008 Sensitivity and perceptual awareness increase with 
practice in metacontrast masking. J. Vis. 9, 18. (doi 10.1167/9.10.18)
49 	
Li, W., Howard, J. D., Parrish, T. B. & Gottfried, J. A. 2008 Aversive learning enhances perceptual and 
cortical discrimination of indiscriminable odor cues. Science 319, 1842—1845. (doi 10.1126/science.
1152837)
50 	
Friston, K. 2008 Hierarchical models in the brain. PLoS Comput. Biol. 4:e1000211. (doi 10.1371/
journal.pcbi.1000211)
51 	
Cleeremans, A. 2008 Consciousness: The radical plasticity thesis. In   Models of brain and mind: 
Physical,   computational and psychological approaches   (eds R. Banerjee & B. K. 
Chakrabarti), Prog. Brain Res. 168, 19-33. (doi 10.1016/S0079-6123(07)68003-0)
52 	
Friston, K. 2006 A free energy principle for the brain. J. Physiology-Paris 100, 70—87. (doi 10.1016/
j.jphysparis.2006.10.001)
53 	
Hofstadter, D.R. 2007 I am a strange loop. New York, NY: Basic Books
Higher-order thoughts in action 26/31
54 	
Wolpert, D. M., Doya, K. & Kawato, M. 2003 A unifying computational framework for motor control and 
social interaction. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 358, 593–602. (doi 10.1098/rstb.2002.1238)
55 	
Schilbach, L., Eickhoff, S. B., Rotarska-Jagiela, A., Fink, G. R. & Vogeley, K. 2008 Minds at rest? Social 
cognition as the default mode of cognizing and its putative relation to the “default system”  of the brain. 
Conscious. Cogn. 17, 457—467.
56 	
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T. & Vogeley, K. In press. 
Toward a second-person neuroscience. Behav. Brain Sci., target article.
57 Anderson, M. L. 2010 Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain. Behav. Brain 
Sci. 33, 245–266. (doi 10.1017/S0140525X10000853)
58 	
Carpendale, J. E. M. & Lewis, C. 2004 Constructing an understanding of mind: The development of 
children's social understanding within social interaction. Behav. Brain Sci. 27, 79—150. (doi 10.1017/
S0140525X04000032)
59 	
Kuhl, P. K. 2007 Is speech learning “gated”  by the social brain? Dev. Sci. 10, 110–120. (doi 10.1111/j.
1467-7687.2007.00572.x)
60 	
Reddy, V. 2008 How infants know minds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
61 	
Becchio, C., Sartori, L. & Castiello, U. 2010 Toward you: The social side of actions. Curr. Dir. Psychol. 
Sci. 19, 183—188. (doi 10.1177/0963721410370131)
62 	
Catmur, C., Walsh, V. & Heyes, C. 2009 Associative sequence learning: The role of experience in the 
development of imitation and the mirror system. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 364, 2369–2380. (doi 10.1098/
rstb.2009.0048)
63 	
Heyes, C. 2010 Where do mirror neurons come from? Neurosci. Biobehav. R. 34, 575–583. (doi 10.1016/
j.neubiorev.2009.11.007)
64 	
Triesch, J., Jasso, H. & Deak, G. O. 2007 Emergence of mirror neurons in a model of gaze following. 
Adapt. Behav. 15, 149–165. (doi 10.1177/1059712307078654)
65 	
Frith, C. D. & Frith, U. 2012 Mechanisms of social cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 63, 287-313. (doi 
10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100449)
66 	
Schilbach, L., Bzdok, D., Timmermans, B., Fox, P.T., Laird, A.R., Vogeley, K., Eickhoff, S.B. 
2012 Introspective minds: Using ALE meta-analyses to study commonalities in the neural correlates of 
emotional processing, social & unconstrained cognition.   PLoS ONE 7, e30920. (doi 10.1371/
journal.pone.0030920)
67 	
Raichle, M. E., MacLeod, A. M., Snyder, A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A. & Shulman, G. L. 2001 A 
default mode of brain function. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 98, 676—682. (doi 10.1073/pnas.98.2.676)
68 	
Cavanna, A. E. & Trimble, M. R. 2006 The precuneus: A review of its functional anatomy and 
behavioural correlates. Brain 129, 564—583. (doi 10.1093/brain/awl004)
69 	
Hagmann, P., Cammoun, L., Gigandet, X., Meuli, R., Honey, C. J., Wedeen, V. J. & Sporns, O. 2008 
Mapping the structural core of human cerebral cortex. PLoS Biol. 6, e159. (doi 10.1371/journal.pbio.
0060159)
Higher-order thoughts in action 27/31
70 	
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R. & Schacter, D. L. 2008 The brain’s default network: Anatomy, 
function, and relevance to disease. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1124, 1—38. (doi 10.1196/annals.1440.011)
71 	
Fransson, P. & Marrelec, G. 2008 The precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex plays a pivotal role in the 
default mode network: Evidence from a partial correlation network analysis. NeuroImage 42, 1178—
1184. (doi 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.05.059)
72 	
Margulies, D. S., Vincent, J. L., Kelly, C., Lohmann, G., Uddin, L. Q., Biswal, B. B., Villringer, A., 
Castellanos, F. X., Milham, M. P. & Petrides, M. 2009 Precuneus shares intrinsic functional architecture 
in humans and monkeys. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 106 20069—20074. (doi 10.1073/pnas.0905314106)
73 	
Glahn, D. C., Winkler, A. M., Kochunov, P., Almasy, L., Duggirala, R., Carless, M. A., Curran, J. C., 
Olvera, R. L., Laird, A. R., Smith, S. M., Beckmann, C. F., Fox, P. T. & Blangero, J. 2010 Genetic control 
over the resting brain. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107, 1223—1228. (doi 10.1073/pnas.0909969107)
74 	
Carhart-Harris, R. L. & Friston, K. J. 2010   The default-mode, ego-functions and free-energy:   A 
neurobiological account of Freudian ideas. Brain 133, 1265—1283. (doi 10.1093/brain/awq010)
75 	
Fair, D. A., Cohen, A. L., Dosenbach, N. U. F., Church, J. A., Miezin, F. M., Barch, D. M., Raichle, M. E., 
Petersen, S. E. & Schlaggar B. L. 2008 The maturing architecture of the brain’s default network. 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 4028–32. (doi 10.1073/pnas.0800376105)
76 	
Kelly, A. M., Di Martino, A., Uddin, L. Q., Shehzad, Z., Gee, D. G., Reiss, P. T., Margulies, D. S., 
Castellanos, F. X. & Milham, M. P. 2009 Development of anterior cingulate functional connectivity from 
late childhood to early adulthood. Cereb. Cortex 19, 640–657. (doi 10.1093/cercor/bhn117)
77 	
O'Regan, J. K. & Noë, A. 2001 A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behav. Brain 
Sci. 24, 883—917. (doi 10.1017/S0140525X01000115)
78 	
Graziano, M. S. A. & Kastner, S. 2011 Human consciousness and its relationship to social neuroscience: 
A novel hypothesis. Cognitive Neurosci. 2, 98—113. (doi 10.1080/17588928.2011.565121)
Higher-order thoughts in action 28/31
Supplementary Material
Simulation 1 – Blindsight
General architecture. The architecture of the networks is depicted in Fig. 2b (main article). The first-order network 
was a backpropagation autoassociator, consisting of a 100-unit input layer, itself connected to a layer of 60 hidden units, 
which were finally connected to a 100-unit output layer. The second-order network was a feedforward backpropagation 
network, the input of which consisted of a 100-unit comparison matrix, representing the match between the first-order 
input and output layers. Each of these units calculated the difference between each pair of corresponding input and 
output units in the first-order network. For instance, if first-order input unit #6(i) had an activation of 0.6 and the first-
order output unit #6(o) had an activation of 0.7, the activation of second-order comparison unit #6(c) would be -0.1. It is 
important to note that these units were thus representing the error of prediction of each first-order output unit. In other 
words, instead of using this error to drive learning by means of backpropagation (in the first-order network only), the 
error is represented as an activation pattern, which can be used to drive any secondary task, in this case wagering (in 
output of the second-order network). The 100 comparison units were connected to two output units representing a high 
and a low wager. Initial connection weights were between -1.0 and 1.0 for the first-order network and between 0.0 and 
0.1 for the second-order output (wager). The comparator weights of the second-order network were set to 1.0 for the 
connections from the first-order input layer, and to -1.0 for the connections from the first-order output layer. 
Wagering specifics. Importantly, the comparator weights between the first-order network and the second-order 
network (1.0 and -1.0), were not subject to learning. Only the first-order network’s weights were modified by learning, 
as were the second-order network’s weights between the comparator units and the wagering units. This allowed for the 
second-order network to learn to wager at the same time the first-order network learned the discrimination task, while 
wagering nevertheless remained independent from the particular activation patterns of the first-order network. Instead, 
the second-order network learned to base its wagers on the degree to which a specific presented pattern (first-order 
input) corresponded to the internal signal it elicited (first-order output).
Patterns. Network pre-training set consisted of 200 patterns, half of which represented mere noise (unit activations 
chosen random between 0.0 and 0.02), and half of which represented a possible stimulus (for each pattern, 99 out of 100 
units had an activation between 0.0 and 0.02, and one unit had an activation between 0.0 and 1.0. We did not always use 
an activation of 1.0, as we wanted to create situations in which the network would be unable or have great difficulty 
distinguishing and localizing the stimulus (subthreshold condition), and hence would learn to wager low in such cases. 
As the first-order network is contrastive, for “stimulus present” trials the first-order target patterns consisted of 99 units 
set to 0.0, and one unit set to 1.0, whereas the target patterns for the “stimulus absent” trials consisted of 100 units set to 
0.0. A discrimination threshold was applied on the first-order network, so that at least one unit had to be above 0.5 for 
the pattern to be distinguished from mere noise. The target of the second-order network consisted either of the “high 
wager” unit set to 1.0 and the “low wager” unit set to 0.0 if (a) the first-order network localized a stimulus (threshold set 
such that the output unit activation > 0.5) and the stimulus was presented (input contained the stimulus), or (b) the first-
order network did not recognize any stimulus and there was none presented; either the second-order network’s target 
was “high wager” = 0.0 and “low wager” = 1.0, if (c) the first-order network recognized a stimulus that was not 
presented (hallucination), or (d) the first-order network failed to recognize a stimulus that was presented (blindness). 
Pre-training. Each network was pre-trained on the 200 patterns for 150 epochs. first-order network’s learning rate 
was 0.9, while second-order network’s learning rate (between comparator and wagering units)  was set to 0.1. All units’ 
momentum was 0.0, while temperature was 1.0. This pre-training allows the second-order network to learn the degree 
to which it can trust what the first-order network recognizes. It corresponds to a healthy brain learning to make 
distinctions between what it does and doesn’t see. 
Testing.  We tested the network in three different conditions. Each of these represented a different way of 
manipulating the signal-to-noise ratio, and hence a different degree and nature of blindness. First, under 
“Suprathreshold stimulus” condition, the networks were presented with the same set of 200 patterns as in pre-training. 
Second, networks were tested under two different blindness conditions. In the “Subthreshold stimulus” condition 
(representing the Blindsight condition), blindness was simulated by adding noise (+ 0.0012) to every input of the first-
order network, except the one representing the stimulus. In the “Low Vision” condition, blindness was simulated by 
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reducing the activation of the stimuli (instead of varying from 0.0 to 1.0, they varied between 0.0 and 0.3). 
Additional Results. As shown in Table 1, simulating blindness by reducing signal strength leads to very different 
results than by adding noise, and does not result in blindsight. For “Low Vision”, we observe a situation unrelated to 
blindsight but rather reflecting blindness in general, in which the networks completely fail to show any discriminatory 
ability (50.3% correct) but are still able to wager well above chance (advantageous wagers in 69.6% of the trials). This 
effect is a consequence of the first-order network’s discrimination threshold, which is difficult to attain in this “Low 
Vision” condition, but which has however no consequence on the spreading of input and output activations to the 
second-order network. In other words, the first-order network will hardly detect anything, causing the second-order 
network to lose confidence in the first-order network for the “stimulus present”  patterns. Therefore the second-order 
network wagers low every time it feels a stimulus should have been detected. Thus, although the first-order network 
does not detect any stimulus, wagers are warranted and wagering performance remains advantageous. Simply said, the 
metacognitive network “knows” that it is blind.
Robustness of the results. The blindsight simulations are the only ones that depend on the specific choices made for 
the different parameters (learning rates, epochs, noise), as we wished to reproduce situations of blindsight and of 
blindness without resulting to more extreme measures such as, for instance, cutting the connections. We included a 
different possibility of simulating blindness, to illustrate the impact of such choices.
Low Vision Correct Incorrect Total
High Wager 31,83 11,93 43,77
Low Wager 18,43 37,80 56,23
Total 50,27 49,73 100,00
Table 1. Additional results of the Blindsight simulation. Here blindness is simulated by manipulating the signal-to-
noise ratio through decreased stimulus activation. Optimal wagers are underlined.
Simulation 2 – Artificial Grammar Learning Task
General architecture. The architecture was largely similar to that used in the first simulation, and is depicted in Fig. 
2b. The first-order network was a backpropagation autoassociator, consisting of a 48-unit input layer (representing a 
string of minimum 3 items and maximum 8, each being one of 5 possible letters, constructed according to the selected 
artificial grammar), connected to a layer of 40 hidden units, who were connected to the 48-unit output layer. The input 
of the second-order network consisted of a 48-unit comparison matrix, representing, as in Simulation 1, the difference 
between the first-order input and output activations. These units were connected to two output units representing a high 
and a low wager. Initial connection weights were between -1.0 and 1.0 for the first-order network and between 0.0 and 
0.1 for the second-order output. The comparator weights of the second-order network were set to 1.0 for the 
connections from the first-order input layer and to -1.0 for the connections from the first-order output layer. 
Wagering specifics. As in Simulation 1, the comparator weights were not subject to learning, for the exact same 
reasons. The basis of the wagering mechanism was identical. 
Patterns. We used 80 random patterns for pre-training. For actual training and testing, we constructed 75 patterns 
according to a specific Grammar A, and 30 patterns according to a Grammar B, each pattern representing a string from 
three to eight letters. All input/target patterns consisted of activations of either 1.0 or 0.0. A specific winner-take-all 
mechanism was added to the output layer in order to select the successive letters of the string that the first-order 
network recognized. The target of the second-order network was determined in a way identical to Simulation 1. 
Pre-training and training. The two network sets were first subjected to pre-training on 80 random patterns for 60 
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epochs, allowing the second-order network to learn how to wager independently of any first-order task. In order to 
achieve this, half of the patterns were accompanied by learning in the first-order network, while the other half were not. 
In both cases, the second-order network had to wager high when first-order input and output matched, and low when 
they did not. Following pre-training, all first-order network’s connections were reset to initial conditions, whereas 
second-order network’s weights were kept as was until the end of the simulation. During the actual training phase, only 
the first-order networks were trained again on 45 patterns of Grammar A. Of 30 networks, 15 were assigned to a “High 
Consciousness” condition and were trained for 12 epochs, while 15 networks in the “Low Consciousness” condition 
were trained for only 3 epochs. During their respective periods of training, first-order network’s and second-order 
network’s learning rates were set to 0.4, units’ momentum was 0.5, and temperature was 1.0. The use of different 
learning phases for the first-order network and the second-order network in this simulation provides an illustration of 
first-order and second-order independency in the brain.
Testing.  We tested all 30 networks on the same set of 60 patterns, consisting of 30 novel Grammar A patterns, and 
30 Grammar B patterns.
Robustness of the results. The simulations do not depend on the specific choices made for the different parameters 
(learning rates, momentums, epochs), but should be manipulated one by one in order to maintain the generalization 
effect on the second-order knowledge.
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